Ford of Canada’s sales plunged 14.1 per cent in September and the news was almost as bad in the United States – sales down 11.2 per cent. In particular, combined F-Series sales in both countries approached a double-digit decline in September, year-on-year. As the F-Series goes, so goes Ford.

Jim Hackett, Ford’s president and CEO, with Executive Chairman Bill Ford (right).

A review of analyst sentiment by NASDAQ shows a generally bearish or negative view of Ford Motor for a number of reasons, not least of which are the costly aluminum and steel tariffs imposed by President Trump. (Ford most definitely is NOT a winner in this trade war.)

Ford also remains incredibly dependent on pickup and SUV sales in North America, at a time when buyers north and south have for years been gorging themselves on big rigs, appear largely satiated, and interest rates are slowly rising. We have reached, for many analysts and insiders, the end of a long and strong auto cycle and the recent downtown in Canadian sales suggest just that.

Still, Ford has been busy on many fronts these past few months, the most important of which intended to build some measure of confidence in the company. CEO Jim Hackett and his acolytes have been blitzing opinion makers, investors and analysts with the promise of new product and technology initiatives, while also slashing costs.

Ah, the reorganization and refocus of Ford. It will cost $11 billion (US), says the company. But in the longer term, Ford plans to become a powerhouse global automaker by:

• eliminating cars from its North American lineup;
• doubling down on electrification and autonomous drive
• growing Lincoln;
• reinforcing the strengths in its home market (the F-Series pickup);
• forging alliances (with Volkswagen, for instance);
• and pushing hard into so-called mobility services.

Obviously, Ford’s leadership understands the gravity of the situation. Still, it is shocking to see Ford in such a sorry state, with quality woes, business deficiencies and critics worrying about Ford’s share price and dividend. Just a few years ago, in 2014, Ford was healthy, immensely profitable and growing in essential markets like China. Ford was admired for its products and the apparent depth of its leadership bench.

Yet after former CEO Alan Mulally retired in 2014 following an eight-year run, Ford quickly began to slide. Ford’s situation today has been a long time coming. So, what happened?

If I were writing a drama in three acts, this is how I’d pen the Ford story, dating back to the early 2000s:

Act 1:

Part of Ford’s new strategy includes going all-in on hybrids to bring more capability to customers of our most popular and high-volume vehicles like F-150, Mustang, Explorer, Escape and Bronco – and serve as a hedge for customers against higher gas prices.

We meet Ford, a global automotive giant, but one also deeply troubled. Ford’s business is almost entirely dependent on pickup and SUV sales (a familiar refrain) that will come under immense pressure later in the decade as fuel prices rise and the economy crashes.

And Ford itself is a company wracked by internal rivalries and bitter infighting. The company lacks creative and forward-thinking leadership, and is struggling with out-dated products and processes. A collection of underperforming and costly luxury brands (Aston Martin, Jaguar, Land Rover and Volvo) is draining company coffers. Ford in 2001 does not have any significant presence in what will emerge to be the largest car market in the world, China.

Enter Mulally, with his Bill Nye the Science Guy affect, and the steely backbone and crisis management skills of, say, a Dwight Eisenhower. Mulally arrives in 2006, full of energy and promise, and he quickly realizes that Ford is on the brink of failing as a company – of bankruptcy.

He recognizes that Ford needs a giant pile of cash to fund a restructuring, some $22.5 billion (US). He orders Ford to leverage everything, including the company logo, just before the great recession of the late 2000s hits, making it virtually impossible to borrow money on the open market.

And he conducts a fire sale of his costly and money-losing premium brands, with the exception of Lincoln. Ford’s Premier Automotive Group is sold off, piece by piece, for pennies on the total investment dollar. Chinese buyers (Geely) get Volvo, Indian buyers (Tata) get Jaguar Land Rover and Aston Marin goes to an investment group funded in large part by buyers from the Middle East.

Act II:

With a fortress of borrowed cash in place before the credit markets seize, and costs being brought under control (so long, PAG) Ford avoids bankruptcy and a government bailout. This bolsters the Ford brand, with admirers noting that Ford is weathering a global economic crisis without taxpayer support (which is not entirely true, but that’s a complicated story).

Ford uses the borrowed money to pay for a complete rebuild. Its lineup is refashioned by a streamlined global product development team, with an emphasis on performance, driving dynamics and stylish designs. The company itself is completely reorganized. There are layoffs, a dividend cut and all number of downsizing activities designed to preserve cash.

Under the leadership of product boss Derrick Kuzak, Ford begins launching a series of new models that are well received — Focus, Fiesta and Mondeo among cars and a remade F-Series pickup, too, among other light-truck models.

The legendary and poisonous infighting at Ford is tamped down and more executives are promoted on merit, rather than for political acumen and utter ruthlessness. How different does Ford become? The new James Bond, played by Daniel Craig in the Casino Royale franchise re-boot, drives a Ford Mondeo. And nobody laughs.

As the early 2010s unfold, Ford pays back its loans, its new products win awards, the share price and Ford’s dividend return and Mulally is hailed as the very embodiment of management genius. Mulally, having earned hundreds of millions in salary and bonuses, readies a retirement that comes in the summer of 2014.

Act III: Things fall apart.

Mark Fields is appointed CEO, ending years of speculation about Mulally’s successor. This is like making Bo Belinsky your cleanup hitter and leaving Babe Ruth on the bench. Of all the possible leadership hopefuls at Ford, Fields is generally considered by far the weakest hitter. His fiercest and cruelest critics refer to him as an empty suite topped by a mullet.

Former Ford Motor Company CEO Mark Fields reportedly was more concerned with the nuts and bolts of running a car manufacturer than artificial intelligence, 3D printing, robotics and so-called “deep learning.

And Fields, indeed, proves to be a Belinsky-like flop. Ford lags in developing new models and technologies, its Asia business stalls, Europe continues to deliver underwhelming returns and poor quality becomes a running joke. Less than three years after becoming CEO, Fields is fired, but lands softly thanks to the inevitable golden parachute that comes as a reward for failed CEOs.

The new CEO, Jim Hackett, is not generally considered the second coming of Mulally, though it’s early and an unfair comparison. That said, Hackett began his career in the packaged goods business, ran an office furniture company and was interim athletic director at the University of Michigan – not exactly the resume of a car company CEO – and certainly not as eye-popping as the MIT-trained, Boeing executive that was Mulally. Jim Hackett does bring energy and enthusiasm and, critically, has the support of the Ford family, which still controls the company.

Hackett positions himself as the avatar of a kind of divine, forward-thinking leadership in the auto industry. He says the “new” Ford will focus on high-margin, high-growth businesses, though Ford, as always, remains almost entirely dependent on the profits from pickups and SUVs.

So, will Ford’s latest reengineering make for a star reborn? Perhaps, but it will be tough to duplicate the successes of the Mulally era. I am not a car company investor, but if I were, Ford would not be in my portfolio.